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Executive Summary
This publication details the foundational logic supporting a call to action, related to a broad-based effort to articulate and 
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.
We argue that coordinated, “whole-of-gov-
ernment” action toward this end is essential to 
meet the nation’s most important economic, 
social, and security obligations. Furthermore, 
we contend that the second Obama adminis-
tration, working in close collaboration with 
executive agencies, Congress, and the private 
sector, is well-positioned to act on what we 
perceive to be a historic opportunity – capital-
izing on both the foundations of veteran- 
focused policy and progress enacted over the 
past decade and the overwhelming public 
support for returning veterans and military 
families – to craft and institutionalize  
a National Veterans Strategy.
Our purpose is to provide a researched 
and logically-developed case for action that is 
grounded in this nation’s social and cultural 
traditions and attuned to the practical realities 
of our contemporary economic and political 
climate. Given this purpose, it is important to 
highlight what this publication is not. It is not 
our intent to: 
1)	 Define	what	a	National	Veterans	Strategy	
should espouse, with regard to issue-
specific	policy	or	practice;	or
2) Identify or prioritize the many issue-based 
concerns that might inform or drive the 
process toward a National Veterans Strategy.
Instead, we suggest that these important 
issues represent outcomes resulting from a 
thoughtful and consensus-building strategy 
planning process. We do, however, suggest 
the basis for how such a strategy planning 
process might proceed.
WHY NOW?
Why is now the time to act on a National 
Veterans Strategy?
1) The federal government’s tenuous, 
long-term	fiscal	trajectory	is	forcing	
policymakers	to	confront	difficult	choices	
related to resource allocation, which may 
possibly	affect	funding	for	benefits	and	
services impacting veterans and their 
families. A National Veterans Strategy will 
enable	focused,	efficient	and	principled	
fiscal	decision-making.
2) The current institutional framework govern-
ing the scope of challenges affecting veterans 
and their families remains far too disparate, 
reactive, and administratively marginalized, 
despite the best intentions of many in the 
public and private sectors. A National Vet-
erans Strategy is likely to support improved 
interagency and public-private coordination, 
in turn supporting strategic choices that 
position inherently limited resources in their 
first,	best	use.
3) It is reasonable and prudent to believe 
that, despite considerable goodwill toward 
veterans and military families that exists 
today, veteran-focused concerns may fade 
from public consciousness after 2014 as 
the nation moves past thirteen years of 
sustained war. Action now toward crafting 
a National Veterans Strategy is conducive to 
institutionalizing systems and practices that 
may sustain citizen- and government-wide 
investment in the nation’s veterans and 
military families into the future.
4) Research and data-driven scholarship that 
informs veterans’ policy is central to prin-
cipled policy formulation, implementation 
and evaluation. A National Veterans Strategy 
is best positioned to cultivate, unite and 
organize	an	interdisciplinary	field	of	veteran	
policy studies that may serve to balance 
economically rational decision-making   
with principled policymaking  in the face 
of an increasingly constrained resource 
environment.  
5) Assuming that the all-volunteer force (AVF) 
will endure, a strong social and cultural 
connection between those who volunteer 
for service and those who do not is neces-
sary to engender broad societal support for 
the post-service challenges impacting veter-
ans and their families. A National Veterans 
Strategy that facilitates and institutionalizes 
a three-way dialogue between the public, 
the military, and the government reinforces 
stable civil-military relations through  
increased public engagement in veteran 
and military affairs.
6) The future of the AVF is dependent upon 
the military’s ability to continuously attract 
the nation’s most skilled, talented and 
service-minded individuals. A National 
Veterans Strategy is symbolic, but more 
importantly	instrumental,	in	affirming	
America’s enduring commitment to both 
the AVF model and those who volunteer to 
serve (today and in the future).
A NATIONAL VETERANS STRATEGY:  
THE FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
The economic, social and security foundations 
of a National Veterans Strategy should be 
grounded in a set of closely-held assumptions 
and attitudes about American citizenship, 
fairness, military service and civil-military rela-
tions. While not all-inclusive, the foundational 
assumptions informing a National Veterans 
Strategy include:
1) The social contract between American so-
ciety and its veterans is inviolate, enduring 
and must be continuously upheld.
2) The social contract between American 
society and its veterans, by extension, confers 
a societal obligation to the families of those 
who serve.
3) While veterans are honored in American  
society today, this social distinction is  
neither a historical constant, nor is it  
assured for future generations.
4) The existing institutional arrangement 
governing veterans’ policy is not adequate-
ly informed or coordinated by a coherent 
“whole-of-government” policy or optimally 
integrated with private-sector efforts.
5)	 Changes	to	the	rights,	benefits	and	services	
that represent societal means of satisfying 
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the social contract between the nation and 
those who serve, should be principled, 
rational and coordinated.
6) A positive social perception of military 
service supports the AVF imperative of 
recruiting a high-quality and socio-econom-
ically representative force.
7) Efforts to support the post-service welfare 
of those who volunteer for service positive-
ly serves the AVF imperative of recruiting 
a high-quality and socio-economically 
representative force.
In this report we deconstruct these assump-
tions to illustrate their economic, social and 
national security implications and suggest how 
and why these assumptions inform the set of 
“guiding questions” appropriate to serve as a 
framework for a National Veterans Strategy 
planning process.
BUILDING CONSENSUS AND PROCESS: 
GUIDING QUESTIONS
How would consensus around a National Vet-
erans Strategy process proceed?  We provide 
a set of guiding questions to: 1) constructively 
frame an inclusive dialogue on veterans’  
issues	and	policy	goals;	and	2)	serve	as	an	ini-
tial framework from which to craft a strategic 
planning process, including the rules, incen-
tives, oversight mechanisms, and resource 
coordination	aimed	at	efficient	and	effective	
policy implementation. At the highest level, 
these questions include:
1) Who should be involved in a strategic con-
versation and planning process impacting 
veterans’ policy?
2) Why do we, as Americans, care for our 
veterans and their families?
3) Who is an American veteran?
4)	 What	recognition,	benefits	or	services	 
ought the nation provide its veterans and 
their families? 
5) What can the nation reasonably afford 
to provide its veterans, today and in the 
future?
6)	 How	(and	by	who)	should	these	benefits	 
and services be delivered?
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS
We maintain that the second Obama adminis-
tration, working in close partnership with Con-
gress and the private sector, is well-positioned 
to act on a historic opportunity to craft and 
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.
Given the overwhelming public support for 
veterans and military families, combined with 
progress and momentum resulting from recent 
policy and practice successes, now is the time to 
act. We offer six initial recommendations as a 
path toward realizing the inherent potential of 
a National Veterans Strategy:
1) Create a presidentially directed Veterans’ 
Public Engagement and Collaborative 
Governance Commission, responsible for 
engaging a broad base of stakeholders in a 
dialogue on veterans’ issues. 
2) Establish a single point of authority 
(directive and budgetary), responsible for 
coordinating and directing the execution of 
a National Veterans Strategy.
3)  Establish an Interagency Policy Committee 
on Veterans, responsible for crafting a  
National Veterans Strategy.
4)  Establish a standing National Veterans 
Advisory Board, responsible for providing 
strategic advice and counsel to the 
president, Congress and implementing 
agencies related to veteran’s policy.
5)  Create and institutionalize a forward-
looking, periodic review process designed 
to assess evolving veterans’ policy and 
programs across the federal government.
6)  Create a voluntary coalition of private 
sector stakeholders, responsible for 
cultivating and formalizing a model of 
collaborative engagement that best aligns 
the resources of government, corporate, 
foundation and community partners in 
support of veterans and their families.
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“The repercussions of war 
persist for years and decades 
after the last shot is fired, 
but we seldom consider the 
inevitable costs, the economic 
consequences, and the impact 
on quality of life for those who 
fought and their families. 
As a war-weary America 
returns from 13 years of 
exhausting conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, we must put in a 
place a long-term strategy for 
taking care of the wounded, 
reconstructing lives and 
repaying war debts.”
 
—Professor Linda J. Bilmes
 Harvard University
 Co-author of The Three Trillion Dollar  
	 War:	The	True	Cost	of	the	Iraq	Conflict

As the end of America’s longest wartime chapter nears, questions about how the nation will support and empower its 
newest generation of military veterans have 
ascended in the national political discourse.
Academics, policy analysts, the media 
and veterans groups continue to highlight 
the need for collaborative and coordinated 
efforts to address the challenges, concerns, 
opportunities and innovations impacting the 
post-service life course of those who have 
shouldered the burden of the nation’s wars. 
Issues such as homelessness, suicide, mental 
health, unemployment, education and com-
prehensive	access	to	benefits	and	healthcare	
sit atop this collective priority list (Berglass, 
2010,	2012;	Berglass	&	Harrell,	2012;	Carter,	
2012;	Tanielian	&	Jaycox,	2008).
The Obama administration has made 
praiseworthy efforts to coordinate govern-
ment-wide action focused on the issues 
impacting veterans and their families. Initia-
tives	such	as	Joining	Forces	have	heightened	
public awareness of the challenges facing 
many veterans and military families and 
have provided an opportunity for engaged 
citizens to act in response to those challenges 
(The White House, 2011). The Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of Defense 
(DoD), Department of Labor (DOL), Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), the Small 
Business Administration (SBA), and other fed-
eral agencies have made meaningful strides 
toward transforming policies, practices and 
service delivery systems to better address the 
contemporary realities associated with sup-
porting the post-service life course of the na-
tion’s	veterans	(HCVA,	2012;	HUD,	2012;	The	
White House, 2012).1 Further, Congress has 
demonstrated a pattern of largely bipartisan 
support and leadership focused on improving 
the situation of the nation’s veterans and 
families. Select examples of important legisla-
tive actions include the Veterans Opportunity 
to Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes Act, the Post-
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9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act and 
the	Honoring	America’s	Veterans	&	Caring	for	
Camp	Lejeune	Families	Act	of	2012.	
However, following more than 12 years 
of sustained war – and in light of current 
and planned reductions in the size of the U.S. 
military – it remains the opinion of many 
leading voices in government, academia and 
the veterans community that the economic, 
social and governance challenges associat-
ed with effectively meeting our national 
obligation to our veterans and their families 
will present a formidable challenge in the 
years	and	decades	ahead	(Berglass,	2010;	
Carter,	2013;	Chandra	et	al.,	2008;	Wright,	
2012a, 2012b). Importantly, the consequenc-
es associated with failing in our collective 
obligation	to	the	nation’s	veterans	are	high;	
such a failure will have adverse implications 
for the sustainability of an AVF2 and thus our 
national security (Pincus, 2013). Additionally, 
failing	to	effectively,	efficiently	and	meaning-
fully empower those who have shouldered 
the burden of the nation’s wars may precipi-
tate social and economic challenges capable 
of overwhelming these supportive services 
for decades.
Thus, we contend that the second 
Obama administration, working in close 
collaboration with executive agencies, 
Congress, and the private sector, is well-
positioned to act on a historic opportunity 
— capitalizing on both the foundations 
of policy and progress enacted over the 
past decade and the overwhelming public 
support for returning veterans and military 
families — to conceptualize (in doctrine) 
The second Obama administration, 
working in close collaboration with 
executive agencies, Congress, and the 
private sector, is well-positioned to act 
on a historic opportunity.
“
”
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“As the end of the longest war in 
our nation’s history draws near, a 
National Veterans Strategy would 
serve as an enduring thank you 
on behalf of a grateful nation as 
our generation of veterans return 
home to their families.”
—SMA Ken Preston (Ret.) 
 13th Sergeant Major of the Army
“Having a coherent articulation 
of the national responsibility 
for veterans’ support will be 
critical in the time ahead. I 
applaud this effort, concur that 
it is a worthy objective, and do 
not understate the magnitude 
of the challenge.”
—Hon. Sean O’Keefe
 Chairman and CEO,  
	 EADS	North	America
 10th NASA Administrator
	 69th	Secretary	of	the	Navy
and institutionalize (in policy) a National 
Veterans	Strategy.	More	specifically,	to:	
1) Initiate dialogue and build toward  
broad consensus related to the 
foundational	assumptions	that	define	
our collective obligation (today and in 
the future) to those who volunteer for 
military	service;	
2) Propose and formalize mechanisms to 
embed those assumptions into a “whole-
of-government” strategic policy, practice 
and infrastructure (where appropriate) 
that engages and empowers the private 
sector, veteran service organizations and 
local	communities;	and
3) Develop and implement a forward-
looking strategic planning process that 
informs veterans’ policy in a way that is 
efficient,	effective	and	consistent	with	the	
assumptions that underlie the nation’s 
obligation to all those who have served.
A NATIONAL VETERANS STRATEGY 
SUPPORTS THREE PRIMARY 
OBJECTIVES
First, a National Veterans Strategy represents 
a mechanism to harnesses citizen- and gov-
ernment-wide investment and engagement 
in the concerns of the nation’s veterans and 
military families. By design, the inclusion of 
a broad and formalized public dialogue on 
veteran issues – a necessary condition of a 
National Veterans Strategy – is an important 
and distinguishing feature from other stra-
tegic planning processes, which are largely 
exercises internal to the federal government. 
Emphasizing a national dialogue in this 
process publically renews the implicit social 
contract between American society and its 
veterans and military families. Moreover,  
robust connections between the American 
people, the military (including veterans and 
their families) and the government – the 
“paradoxical trinity” (Clausewitz, 2006, pp. 
30-31) – are important factors to ensur-
ing healthy civil-military relations and a 
well-grounded grand strategy. Dialogue on 
these matters will remain critical as we enter 
an era marked by global uncertainty and 
diminishing societal ties to the armed forces. 
Second, a National Veterans Strategy is 
positioned to foster sound, 21st century pub-
Finally, a National Veterans Strategy is fun-
damental to a sustainable national defense, 
namely the recruitment and preservation 
of a robust, all-volunteer military force. The 
all-volunteer military must continually attract 
the interest of diverse and talented Americans 
— representative of the diversity inherent in 
American society — to succeed in its security 
mission (DOD, 2012).3	The	efficacy	of	pro-
grams and supports related to the transition 
of service members to civilian life, and how 
those programs are perceived by future volun-
teers, represents an essential motivation for 
future military service. Establishing a national 
strategic planning process for veterans’ issues 
pays tribute to those who have served and 
concomitantly signals to future generations 
that military service will be socially regarded 
and institutionally supported – for years and 
decades to come – as our nation’s highest 
calling and ultimate expression of citizenship. 
Given the potential advantages highlighted 
above, this report details the foundational 
logic supporting action toward articulating 
and institutionalizing a National Veterans 
Strategy. To that end, it is important at this 
point to highlight what this publication is  
not. It is not our purpose to:
1)		Define	what	a	National	Veterans	Strategy	
‘is’ or should espouse with regard to  
policy or practice, or 
2)  Identify or prioritize the issue-based 
concerns that will presumably make up 
the practice focus of a National Veterans 
Strategy. 
We contend that these important (and 
likely contentious) issues represent outcomes 
that will result from the process of carefully 
crafting and institutionalizing a National 
Veterans Strategy. Instead, our purpose is to 
offer a researched and logically developed 
“case for acting” on the imperative to develop 
a National Veterans Strategy – a strategy 
that is situated in both this nation’s social 
and cultural traditions and in the practical 
realities inherent in a contemporary social 
and economic environment.
lic governance. Veterans’ policy is rapidly 
transforming into a “wicked problem” due 
to the broad scope and complexity of issues it 
aims to address. A National Veterans Strategy 
will likely better align the efforts and resourc-
es of myriad governmental, non-governmen-
tal and private stakeholders working in this 
policy space toward a common set of policy 
goals. Moreover, it will more fully institution-
alize and strengthen administrative systems, 
interagency and public-private coordination 
and planning processes resulting in better-in-
formed policy and program evaluation. Fur-
ther,	effective	and	efficient	allocation	of	the	
tools, resources, responsibilities and authority 
to both inform and implement veterans’ 
policy and programs will promote more 
timely,	efficient	and	high-quality	outcomes	
for veterans and their families. 
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Military service will be socially  
regarded and institutionally supported 
– for years and decades to come – as 
our nation’s highest calling and ulti-
mate expression of citizenship. 
“
”
In what follows, we begin by addressing 
the question: Why is now the time to act on a 
National Veterans Strategy? Building on what 
we perceive as an urgency for action, we then 
deconstruct the moral, social, economic, and 
security-based assumptions that should both 
motivate and inform the foundation of a Na-
tional Veterans Strategy by highlighting the 
benefits	conferred	to	veterans,	government	
and other stakeholders that would likely re-
sult from this effort. We then offer a series of 
guiding questions that, based on our research, 
represent central issues to be addressed in 
the context of crafting a National Veterans 
Strategy. Finally, we conclude with a series of 
summary recommendations suggestive of a 
pathway to act on the insights suggested by 
this report. 
WHY NOW?  
Many would ask: In light of the fact that the 
Obama	administration	and	Congress	jointly	
face a number of disparate and pressing 
economic, social, and national security 
challenges, why is now the time to act on a 
National Veterans Strategy?    
First, the federal government’s uncertain 
fiscal	trajectory	is	forcing	policymakers	to	
confront	difficult	choices	related	to	funding	
priorities, possibly including veterans’ ben-
efits	and	services	(GAO,	2012a).	Developing,	
articulating and institutionalizing a National 
Veterans Strategy may enable more focused 
and	efficient	use	of	increasingly	constrained	
resources. 
Consider that in 2013 the U.S. will direct 
an estimated $140.3 billion to veteran-related 
programs and services (VA, 2012a). Accord-
ing to the Congressional Research Service 
(Scott, 2012), the VA budget authority last 
year ($130B) was already more than double 
FY2000	levels	($58.5B)	and	14	times	FY1940	
levels	($8.8B)	in	constant	FY11	dollars.	These	
increases are largely driven by rising health-
care	costs	for	an	aging	veteran	population;	an	
increasing	number	of	beneficiaries	eligible	to	
receive	veterans	disability	benefits	(and	the	
complexity	of	those	claims);	and	increases	in	
the scope of income security, housing aid and 
education and training programs such as the 
Post 9/11 GI Bill. It is important to highlight 
that unplanned mandates have contributed 
significantly	to	increases	in	veterans-related	
spending and to the complexity and breath 
of	services	and	benefits	administered	by	the	
VA.
Looking ahead, veterans’ programs and 
benefits	in	the	coming	years	will	experience	
increased pressure from the nearly one mil-
Based on current patterns of benefit claims 
and medical usage, it is estimated that the 
total present value of such costs for Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans over the next 40 years 
is in the range of $600 billion to $1 trillion.”
In the face of resource constraints, if veter-
ans’	programs	and	benefits	become	vulnera-
ble to future spending reductions, it is likely 
that a National Veterans Strategy would 
provide	a	more	judicious	and	consensus-driv-
en lens through which to consider possible 
reductions (as compared to the status quo). 
Within the framework of a National Veterans 
Strategy, proposed reductions would neces-
sarily be considered in the context of the eco-
nomic, moral-ethical and broader national 
geostrategic implications vis-à-vis America’s 
obligation to its military veterans. A coherent 
policy planning framework will serve as a 
principled mechanism to rationalize future 
spending	on	veterans’	benefits	with	broader,	
often competing, strategic goals. Moreover, 
since	any	future	cuts	would	thus	be	justified	
according to national priorities, the frame-
work will serve to limit their politicization in 
future budget debates.
Second, the current institutional frame-
work governing the scope of challenges 
affecting veterans remains far too disparate, 
reactive, and administratively marginalized, 
despite the best, well-intentioned efforts of 
myriad actors across the public and private 
sectors. To consider the institutional frame-
work governing the scope of challenges  
affecting	veterans,	we	identified	and	cat-
aloged more than 1,300 Federal and State 
policies, Executive Orders, and agency 
directives that impact (directly or indirectly) 
veterans and/or their families, within a Policy 
Landscape	Matrix	(see	Figures	1	&	2).	While	
the current policy landscape engages almost 
every federal agency in some level of policy 
or programmatic responsibility for veterans 
issues, in many cases these policies – based 
on legislative intent, funding sources, or oth-
er bureaucratic issues – actually marginalize 
opportunities for interagency collaboration 
and	efficient	resource	utilization.	Extant	
policy is “crowding out” meaningful collab-
lion additional service members who are pro-
jected	to	leave	the	military	by	2016	—	adding	
to the over two million post-9/11 veterans that 
have already transitioned to civilian life.
From FY09 to FY11, the VA experienced a 
29% rise in disability claims and has struggled 
keeping pace with this rise (GAO, 2012c). 
Moreover,	post-9/11	veterans	are	filing	for	
disability	benefits	at	a	higher	rate	than	any	
generation before them (VA, 2012b, Marchi-
one, 2012). The severity and complexity of 
many of the health and wellness challenges 
impacting the contemporary generation of 
veterans requires ongoing and increasingly 
advanced protocols of care and rehabilitative 
technologies. With this increased demand for 
veterans’	benefits	and	services,	the	budget	is	
estimated	to	climb	another	18.5%	by	2015,	
exceeding $150 billion (Fraser, 2012). Harvard 
Professor Linda Bilmes (2011, p. 1) writes,  
“The history of previous wars shows that the 
cost of caring for war veterans rises for several 
decades and peaks in 30 to 40 years or more 
after a conflict. This will be especially true for 
veterans of the current wars. Veterans from 
Iraq and Afghanistan are utilizing VA medical 
services and applying for disability benefits 
at much higher rates than in previous wars. 
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According to the Congressional 
Research Service (Scott, 2012), the 
VA budget authority last year ($130B) 
was already more than double  
FY2000 levels ($58.5B) and 14 times 
FY1940 levels ($8.8B) in constant 
FY11 dollars.
“
”
A COMPLEX POLICY LANDSCAPE
To inform this publication, our research team identified and cataloged more than 1,300 
Federal and State policies, Executive Orders, and agency directives that impact (directly or 
indirectly) veterans and/or their families, within a Policy Landscape Matrix. 
The scope of this effort spans the period between 1997 (105th Congress), and 
continues through 2011 (112th Congress). Each policy was catalogued based on 11 
criteria, to include level of government, name, effective date, reference, source, term, 
lead entity, other entity, category, impact area and beneficiary. Additionally, each policy 
was categorized by overarching theme (to summarize the policy objective) to include: 
Education, Employment, Health, Compensation and Other. While our categorization 
methodology focused on identifying – within the universe of all veteran-related polices 
– those that specifically impact the major, post-service concerns of veterans (Education, 
Employment, Health and Compensation), the overwhelming majority of veteran-focused 
policies focused on “Other” themes and objectives. Figure 1 below decomposes the 
distribution of policy objectives represented by the landscape of veterans’ policy as based 
on our review. To further define the “Other” category, additional analysis was performed to 
capture the underlying purpose of these polices, as depicted in Figure 2 below.
Figure 1: Policy ‘Category’ Summary
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oration by marginalizing the opportunity to 
allocate inherently constrained resources  
to	their	first,	best	use.	
For example, the policy landscape  
analysis highlights many examples of redun-
dant effort, overlapping responsibility and 
underutilized programming and resources 
across federal agencies and between federal 
and state governments. While it is not our 
purpose to deconstruct the universe of these 
policy-specific	examples	in	this	report,	we	
observe that some include responsibility 
overlap, duplicative resource allocation, and 
poor coordination between the departments 
of Labor, Veterans Affairs and Defense relat-
ed to veteran employment and training pro-
grams (GAO, 2012b). The VA and Medicare 
were also found to have made $13 billion 
in duplicative payments to providers of 
veterans health-care services (Trivedi, et al., 
2012). Without a unifying framework that 
logically	informs	the	goals	and	objectives	to	
be realized as a consequence of a public in-
vestment in veterans, it becomes exceedingly 
difficult	to	evaluate	the	return	on	the	public	
investment in veteran-focused programs and 
services (Berglass, 2012). 
Third, there is considerable public good-
will toward veterans and military families 
today.	Between	July	2001	and	August	2012,	
there	was	a	181%	increase	in	the	number	
of	registered	veteran	support	nonprofit	
organizations	filing	a	Form	990	with	the	
Internal Revenue Service, with a correspond-
ing increase of $2.9 trillion in reported total 
assets (National Center for Charitable Statis-
tics).4 It is reasonable and prudent to assume, 
however, that the salience of veteran-focused 
concerns will decline in the public con-
sciousness as the nation moves further from 
a decade at war. The community of stake-
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Extant policy is ‘crowding  
out’ meaningful collaboration by mar-
ginalizing the opportunity to allocate 
inherently constrained resources to 
their first, best use.
“
”
Figure 2: ‘Other’ Veterans’ Policies
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holders impacted by the concerns of veter-
ans and their families has a unique – but 
fleeting	–	opportunity	to	marshal	this	extant	
public support and build consensus around a 
common and enduring vision related to the 
community reintegration and post-service 
life course support available to our veterans. 
A comprehensive National Veterans Strategy, 
inclusive of non-governmental and private- 
sector stakeholders, will help to more smartly 
align and focus public and private sector 
resources toward these goals (Berglass, 2012).
Fourth, data-driven scholarship that 
informs veterans’ policy is central to prin-
cipled policy formulation, implementation 
and evaluation – especially in the face of an 
increasingly complex universe of economic, 
social, and policy challenges impacting vet-
erans and military families. This scholarship, 
consequently, demands an interdisciplinary 
perspective to draw upon and integrate im-
portant intellectual contributions from multi-
ple	academic	disciplines	and	fields	of	practice.	
Such a level of coordinated, interdisciplinary 
scholarship aimed at accumulating policy-rel-
evant and actionable knowledge on veterans’ 
issues does not presently exist (Carter, 2012, 
pp. 24-25). If the process includes robust pub-
lic engagement, a National Veterans Strategy 
should help cultivate, unite and organize 
an	interdisciplinary	field	of	veteran	policy	
studies that supports more principled veteran 
policymaking.
Fifth, the maturation and institutional-
ization of the AVF has created a situation 
where a shared burden for national defense 
is	an	artifact	of	the	past;	as	such,	increasing-
ly fewer members of our society have any 
tangible connection to the military (Pew, 
2011a). Naturally, there will always be some 
distance between military and societal norms 
and values. This distance is evident in the fact 
that today, both veterans and non-veterans 
agree that the American public does not fully 
understand the complex challenges facing 
the nation’s veterans and military families 
(Pew, 2011b). Managing this divide requires 
carefully balancing the inherent tensions 
between the military’s functional purpose of 
maintaining a distinct ethos and set of values 
necessary to provide effective security, while 
at the same time ensuring this effort remains 
sensibly responsive to, and culturally inte-
grated with, American society (Burk, 2001). 
Assuming the all-volunteer policy will endure 
given its resilience over the past four decades, 
an ongoing public dialogue is absolutely 
necessary to continually bridge these evolving 
cultural	differences	(Gronke	&	Feaver,	2001,	
p. 161) and to mitigate the perceived alien-
ation resulting from the larger social forces 
at work today (Demers, 2011). Whether the 
civil-military gap widens or converges in the 
years ahead, a National Veterans Strategy will 
institutionalize a three-way dialogue between 
the public, the military, and the government, 
thereby reinforcing stable civil-military  
relations in the long-term through increased 
opportunity for public participation (Clause-
witz,	2006,	pp.	30-31;	Huntington,	2006,	pp.	
78-92).
1973. Thus, we have yet to fully understand 
the implications of the model as related 
to the social contract between those who 
volunteer and those who do not. We know 
from examples of European nations — such 
as the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and espe-
cially the United Kingdom (nations which 
have maintained a long tradition of all-vol-
unteer service) — that post-service policies 
and practices impacting military veterans 
have a direct impact on future recruiting 
and retention (Dandeker, Wessely, Iversen, 
&	Ross,	2006).	Importantly,	we	know	from	
those examples that over time, an all-volun-
teer service model cultivates distance and 
erodes the social contract between those 
who	serve	and	those	who	benefit	from	the	
military service of others (Dandeker, et al., 
2006). Many would suggest the beginnings 
of	a	similar	trend	in	the	U.S.;	a	recent	Pew	
Research	Center	poll	indicates	that	only	48%	
of Americans would recommend military 
service	to	a	young	person.	Further,	while	83%	
of those surveyed acknowledge that military 
members and their families have had to 
make	significant	sacrifices	since	9/11,	seven	
in ten of those who acknowledged this bur-
den	attributed	this	sacrifice	to	simply	“part	
of being in the military” (Pew, 2011b, p. 60). 
Moreover, only 12% of Americans feel the 
public	understands	the	benefits	and	rewards	
of military service well or fairly well (2011b, 
p. 64). In the end, a National Veterans Strate-
gy	is	central	to	affirming	America’s	enduring	
obligation to those who have served and will 
serve in the future.
For these reasons, we suggest a National 
Veterans Strategy facilitates the opportunity 
to re-craft the existing institutional frame-
work that governs and executes veterans’ pol-
icy, in a way that promotes sound, econom-
ical	public	governance;	stable	civil-military	
relations;	and	a	strong,	sustainable	national	
defense. It is abundantly clear that action 
now toward crafting and implementing a  
National Veterans Strategy would confer 
great	benefit	not	only	to	veterans	and	their	
families but to all Americans. 
Finally, national security experts envision 
the future force as smaller, more technolog-
ically-advanced, capable of working with 
global partners and operating in austere 
and,	at	times,	high-profile	circumstances	
(DOD, 2012). This global security environ-
ment demands a future force composed 
of	our	nation’s	most	skilled,	qualified	and	
service-minded individuals – those bright, 
assertive middle and high school students 
carefully attuned to the media and keenly 
aware of issues impacting those who volun-
teer	for	military	service	(Humensky,	Jordan,	
Stroupe,	&	Hynes,	2013).5 As a self-selective 
institution, the AVF is increasingly comprised 
of members who have had former family ties 
to the military (Pew, 2011a). Importantly, the 
past	decade	at	war	is	the	first	extended	test	of	
the all-volunteer model since its inception in 
A National Veterans Strategy: The Economic, Social and Security Imperative 9
A National Veterans Strategy is 
both symbolic and instrumental with 
regard to affirming America’s enduring 
obligation to those who have served, 
and will serve in the future.
“
”
A National Veterans Strategy is necessary to serve three central purposes: 1) to harness and sustain citizen and 
government-wide investment in the concerns 
affecting	veterans	and	military	families;	2)	
promote 21st century public governance 
of	veterans’	issues;	and	3)	contribute	to	
a stronger, sustainable national defense. 
Importantly, each of these purposes is 
grounded in a set of closely-held assumptions 
and attitudes about American citizenship, 
fairness, military service and civil-military 
relations. Accordingly, to articulate a fully-
developed logic supporting a National 
Veterans Strategy – logic intended as a 
foundation for policy advancement and 
administrative action – it is important to 
consider and deconstruct the foundational 
assumptions embedded within the broader 
intent of a National Veterans Strategy. The 
assumptions	identified	below	reflect	a	
number	of	significant	normative	choices	to	
be made within a strategic planning process. 
They are not intended to represent the full  
set of possible assumptions.
CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT-WIDE 
INVESTMENT IN VETERANS AFFAIRS
The	supports	and	benefits	afforded	to	veterans	
in	return	for	their	service	are	a	direct	reflection	
of the extent to which military service is 
valued by society. This support reveals norms 
of	citizenship	and	justice	in	the	context	of	
additional rights and privileges granted to 
military veterans. Determining a fair and 
reasonable level of post-service supports 
demands both national leadership and 
broad civic engagement. A National Veterans 
Strategy establishes a deliberative, democratic 
process that fosters national dialogue and 
builds broad citizen and government-
A National Strategy:  
The Foundational Assumptions
wide engagement in veterans’ policy. As a 
consequence, it holds the added potential 
of helping to repair a pervasive citizenship 
deficit	across	the	nation	(Nabatchi,	2010).	
Importantly, this premise assumes:
ASSUMPTION #1  
The social contract between American society 
and its veterans is inviolate, enduring and 
must be continuously upheld.
AND 
ASSUMPTION #2  
The social contract between American society 
and its veterans, by extension, confers a 
societal obligation to support the families of 
those who serve. 
The notion that cultivating civic and 
governmental engagement in veterans’ 
issues is important assumes an enduring 
moral obligation to veterans. In other words, 
President Lincoln’s pledge “to care for him 
who shall have borne the battle and for his 
widow and his orphan” is an eternal promise 
that holds for present and future generations. 
Indeed, America’s legacy of caring 
for its veterans dates back to the late 
17th century at Plymouth Colony, which 
provided pensions to veterans disabled 
while protecting the colony (VA, n.d., p. 
3). Immediately following the American 
Revolution, the general public sentiment 
reflected	an	ideological	distrust	of	a	standing	
army and the belief that the American 
Revolution was a people’s war shouldered 
by the whole of society (Resch, 1999, p. 
2).	However,	it	was	the	1818	Pension	Act	
that institutionalized the persistent and 
transformative image of the suffering soldier 
as a symbol of American patriotism and 
citizenship and subsequently legitimized 
the Continental Army (1999, pp. 4-5). This 
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“Only when we coordinate and 
collaborate across the public 
and private sector, can we 
hope to provide a continuum 
of support for our veterans, 
especially for our wounded.  
We have to start thinking in 
terms of a 50-year, nationwide, 
coordinated plan. Until we have 
a National Veterans Strategy 
to help coordinate all efforts, 
we will be giving our veterans 
less than they’ve earned on the 
field of battle.”
 
—Jim Knotts
	 Chief	Executive	Officer
 Operation Homefront
enactment of law and creation of a new 
pension regime as a gesture of national 
gratitude cemented “the nation’s celebratory 
rites	of	self-affirmation	and	renewal”	and	
“established a new way to bind [future] 
generations” (p. 201). 
Beyond American heritage and tradition, 
the very act of maintaining a force of volun-
teers to preserve the existing democratic or-
der (e.g., “to defend the Constitution against 
foreign enemies and domestic”) carries with 
it certain moral obligations. At least four 
obligations are germane to the claim that 
America’s social contract is inviolate and 
enduring. 
First, because our military acts on behalf 
of a democratic society to apply force, the 
applied force must necessarily be limited 
to minimize human rights violations and 
remain consistent with society’s democratic 
values (Burk, 2005). This assumption implies 
a direct connection and moral obligation 
between a society and its military personnel, 
specifically	that	military	personnel	are	suffi-
ciently imbued with and committed to acting 
within these values. 
Second, and by extension, the respect and 
dignity of our soldiers and veterans must 
be maintained since they are our agents, 
citizens, and “ends in themselves” (Burk, 
2005,	p.	162)	who	we	subject	to	moral	risks	
in the management of violence and repeated 
“choice[s]	between	lesser	evils”	(Burk,	p.	159;	
Brock and Lettini, 2010). 
Third, the AVF model necessarily means 
that military family members are both 
serving	and	sacrificing,	as	an	inherent	
consequence of a family member’s decision 
to serve in uniform. We often talk of the 
sacrifices	made	by	military	families	as	being	
altruistic and benevolent, whereas in reality 
these	sacrifices	are	a	necessary	condition	of	
sustaining	the	efficacy	of	the	AVF.
Finally, the enduring, intergenerational 
nature of America’s social contract with its 
veterans and military families is rooted in 
a natural, civic duty to create and uphold 
just	institutions	toward	the	improvement	of	
civilization (Rawls, 1971, p. 293). Additional-
ly, generations must not only maintain these 
institutions but also “put aside in each period 
of time a suitable amount of real capital 
accumulation”	according	to	a	“just	savings	
principle” appropriate to the present state of 
ASSUMPTION #3
While veterans are honored in American 
society today, this social distinction is neither 
a historical constant, nor is it assured for 
future generations.
Regardless of attitudes about the recent wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, public sentiment 
for and pride in the military and its veterans 
is at an all-time high (Pew, 2011b, p. 60). 
The American public has demonstrated an 
outpouring of support and generosity for 
veterans. In addition to the recent expan-
sion	of	veterans’	benefits	by	Congress,	
supporting veterans and military families, 
particularly their successful transition to the 
civilian workforce, remains a top priority of 
the	Obama	administration	and	the	Joining	
Forces initiative. The VA is undergoing a 
transformation to better serve the needs of a 
more diverse veteran population including a 
greater focus on female veterans. A new eco-
system	of	nonprofit	organizations	working	
to address the concerns of veterans and their 
families, and an expanding veterans’ policy 
and research community, has emerged over 
the past decade.
Veterans	clearly	enjoy	a	special	status	in	
American society today, unlike Vietnam War 
veterans who preceded them. But as previous 
experience	shows,	this	confidence	may	be	su-
perficial	and	may	not	last	indefinitely	(Gron-
ke	&	Feaver,	2001).	Accordingly,	the	current	
“sea	of	goodwill”	(Berglass,	2012;	Copeland	&	
Sutherland,	2010;	Mullen,	2008)	gives	ample	
prospect to institutionalize a policymaking 
process that ensures constructive debate and 
civil-military dialogue on veterans’ issues 
whether or not rougher waters lie ahead. 
To some degree, establishing a national 
strategy will proactively seize an opportu-
nity	to	prevent	future	injustices	like	those	
experienced by our Vietnam generation. 
Its establishment is a moral argument for 
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society	(pp.	285,	287).	Creating	a	National	
Veterans	Strategy	is	thus	a	morally	justi-
fied	act	that	supports	our	nation’s	capacity	
to maintain our promise to current and 
future generations of veterans and military 
families.
It is important to note that while history 
and convention assume a social contract 
between the nation and its veterans, the 
nature of that contract (regarding rights, 
benefits,	and	honoraria)	has	evolved	–	and	
presumably will continue to evolve – over 
time as a function of social, economic and 
political norms and constraints. Conse-
quently, though we assume the social 
contract between American society and its 
veterans is inviolate, enduring and some-
thing to be upheld, we make no assumption 
with regard to the nature or degree of the 
rights,	benefits,	or	honoraria	conferred	to	
veterans as a means to honor this contract. 
We often talk of the sacrifices 
made by military families as being 
altruistic and benevolent, whereas 
in reality these sacrifices are a 
necessary condition of sustaining  
the efficacy of the AVF.
“
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protecting future volunteers from evolving 
popular opinion and politics over the role 
and use of the armed forces abroad. Should 
declining public opinion and legitimacy in 
the armed forces ever reach a point of crisis, 
a National Veterans Strategy will help to 
better disentangle and constructively channel 
often intertwined debates over military and 
veterans’ policy.
21ST CENTURY PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Caring for veterans and military families 
has evolved into a complex public service. 
To sustain and continuously improve the 
efficient	and	effective	delivery	of	these	
services demands a “whole-of-government” 
vision that transcends any individual agency 
and which engages civil society. 
ASSUMPTION #4
The existing institutional arrangement 
governing veterans’ policy is not adequately 
informed or coordinated by a coherent 
“whole-of-government” policy or optimally 
integrated with private-sector efforts.
Both the scope of veterans’ policy and the 
number of governmental, public and private 
actors operating in this space is expansive. 
Veterans’ policy covers issues of urgent and 
critical concern, including (but not limited 
to) veteran suicide, education, post-traumat-
ic stress (PTS), homelessness and unem-
ployment (Carter, 2012). It includes other 
medium- and long-term areas related to 
benefits,	disability	claims	(including	both	
VA and SSA) and access to healthcare (2012). 
Likewise, the institutional arrangement of 
veteran-related regulations and programs 
is multi-level and multi-sector, involving 
numerous federal agencies, state and local 
governments,	and	private	and	nonprofit	
stakeholders in civil society. 
In	complex	fields	such	as	veterans’	
policy,	major	institutional	reforms	would	
likely	be	slow,	inefficient,	or	worse,	coun-
terproductive to the overall intent of caring 
for veterans and military families during a 
critical postwar transition period. Despite 
redundancies highlighted above, central-
ization of some programs or services may 
be suboptimal since certain agencies have 
niche strengths and comparative advantages 
over others. For example, in comparison to 
the rest of the federal government, the de-
partments of Labor and Commerce have the 
greatest institutional capacity for addressing 
broad unemployment. Yet, tackling unem-
ployment of a more targeted population, 
such as veterans, requires robust coordi-
nation with the VA, DoD, the Chamber of 
Commerce, state governments, the private 
sector and other stakeholders. 
Successful interagency coordination and 
cooperation is typically governed by: 
“a detailed, clearly defined strategy; a 
commitment to shared objectives and clear 
targets informed by an overarching strategic 
vision; a transparency of operations; and 
strategic interests being given priority over 
local or sectional interests” (McQuaid, 2010, 
p. 139).
Strategic planning, which generally outlines 
how resources (means) will be used (ways) 
to achieve stated goals (ends), is especially 
critical in complex policy areas requiring 
collaborative governance arrangements 
and broad multi-sector participation. Yet, 
no comprehensive interagency planning 
process presently exists that adequately gov-
erns the veterans’ policy space – one that 
clearly	defines	a	national	strategic	vision	for	
veterans’	policy;	identifies	short-,	medium-,	
and long-term planning goals across the 
federal	government;	and	establishes	formal	
coordination mechanisms to drive effective 
policy coordination and execution. 
The current role of the VA is to act 
as a service-delivery and implementing 
agency – not a driver of federal policy or 
national strategy. While the VA maintains 
a forward-looking strategic plan outlining 
its departmental vision, transformational 
goals, and planned initiatives through the 
year	2015,	many	of	its	major	initiatives	
are simply unattainable without robust 
integration with other governmental, 
non-governmental, and community-based 
partners. Likewise, while it retains ultimate 
responsibility for veterans’ policy, the VA 
has no authority (nor does any other federal 
agency) to establish or oversee mechanisms 
necessary to drive cross-governmental and 
public-private coordination on veterans’ 
services and programs. 
ASSUMPTION #5
Changes to the rights, benefits, and services 
that represent societal means of satisfying 
the social contract between the nation 
and those who serve should be principled, 
rational and coordinated.
Rising federal debt and statutory entitlement 
program costs (social security, healthcare) are 
placing substantial pressure on discretionary 
programs – including veterans’ affairs. De-
spite an inviolate and enduring obligation to 
veterans and military families (Assumption 
#1),	the	reality	of	finite	resources	and	the	
nation’s	long-term	fiscal	health	demand	cer-
tain limitations and prioritizations. If future 
reductions	in	funding	for	veterans	benefits	
or service are ever considered, making these 
tough choices within the framework of a 
National Veterans Strategy will give them 
justified	and	rationalized	importance,	rather	
than leaving them to unproductive partisan 
debate or ad hoc, incremental outcomes.
Additionally, if the quality and level of 
veterans	benefits	are	to	be	maximized	 
despite leaner budgets, federal, state, and 
local governments and private and non-
profit	sector	partners	must	continue	to	
gain	efficiencies	through	coordination	and	
collaboration driven by a common strategic 
vision. Improved veteran transition to civil-
ian life will help mitigate rising healthcare 
and	benefit	costs,	not	only	across	the	federal	
government, but also at the state level for 
unemployment, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), civilian healthcare, 
and other related costs (i.e., criminal system 
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involvement, substance abuse, domestic 
violence, or others). 
A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL DEFENSE
National security is paramount for survival 
and thus societies must be able to raise and 
maintain defense forces as necessary. The 
way a nation recruits its armed forces sig-
nificantly	impacts	the	relationship	between	
its military and society because it connects 
the individual citizen to the nation’s defense 
(Micewski, 2006, p. 209). 
Over the last 40 years, there has been 
much	debate	over	the	benefits	and	draw-
backs of conscript- and volunteer-based 
recruiting models, especially their respective 
compatibility with democratic values and 
civic	participation	(Abrams	&	Bacevich,	2001;	
Cohen, 2001). This debate continues even 
today	(Cancian,	2011;	Gilroy,	2010;	Yingling,	
2010). Though there were occasional chal-
lenges, the AVF has been tested and proven 
largely	successful	(Bailey,	2009;	CBO,	2007;	
Oi,	2003;	Rostker,	2006;	Warner	&	Asch,	
2001). Since 1973, the AVF has not threatened 
our democracy nor has it created a military 
social caste (Micewski, 2006, p. 213), despite 
well-documented civil-military cultural and 
attitudinal differences (e.g., “the gap”) (Feaver 
&	Kohn,	2001).	However,	the	AVF	remains	
highly dependent upon a continuous supply 
of highly-skilled and educated recruits im-
bued with democratic ideals. This recruiting 
pool is highly sensitive to economic induce-
ments	(including	veterans’	benefits)	and	eco-
nomic	trends	(Simon	&	Warner,	2007).	Thus,	
our premise that a National Veterans Strategy 
is positioned to cultivate and nurture a sus-
tainable national defense is based on:
ASSUMPTION #6
A positive social perception of military 
service positively serves the AVF imperative 
of recruiting a high-quality and socio-
economically representative force.
AND
ASSUMPTION #7
Efforts to support the post-service welfare 
of those who volunteer for service positively 
serves the AVF imperative of recruiting 
a high-quality and socio-economically 
representative force.
The late Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf was 
straightforward about the AVF: “[P]eople 
don’t	join	the	military	to	do	poorly…they	
say, ‘I think I’ll enlist in the Army because 
I want to do better’” (Schwarzkopf, 1991). 
America’s sons and daughters who volun-
tarily choose military service are motivated 
by positive beliefs – a “sense of self-esteem 
and	moral	value”	(Janowitz,	1971,	p.	440)	
– in military service, economic incentives 
or a combination of the two. Fundamental 
values of honor, patriotism, family tradi-
tion and civic obligation motivate military 
service. Gainful employment, advanced 
training and education, and general upward 
economic	mobility	do	so	as	well.	Just	as	im-
portant, the successes of the military itself, 
alongside visible examples of successful vet-
erans, shape public attitudes that, in turn, 
strengthen positive beliefs in and decisions 
about military service.
In the absence of the draft, neither core 
beliefs, nor incentives, nor public favor in 
military	service	are	alone	sufficient	to	sustain	
the	AVF.	Rather,	these	influences	are	jointly	
reinforcing. Effective citizenship and military 
integration	with	society	is	difficult	for	any	
modern democracy, and it must be nur-
tured	(Janowitz,	1983).	Postmodern	ideals	in	
Western Europe serve as a caution to the U.S. 
with respect to the AVF. There, “individual-
ism has taken a toll on citizenship, and while 
there is no shortage of volunteer associations 
assuming a variety of socially useful roles, 
few volunteers relish the thought of serving 
as part of a bureaucratic state organization,” 
including the military (Boene, 2003, p. 175).
Fortunately for now, the sense of duty 
still outpolls other reasons for choosing to 
serve, despite arguments suggesting that 
today’s service members primarily hold 
economic motivations (Krebs, 2009, p. 165). 
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However,	Morris	Janowitz’s	claim	still	holds	
that, “in the long run, it is doubtful whether 
the military establishment, like other public 
agencies, could maintain its organizational 
effectiveness merely by raising monetary 
rewards…[since]	the	incentive	system	
would not necessarily produce the required 
perspectives and professional commitments” 
(1971, p. 422). 
If not continuously nurtured by a society 
that values military service as a respected 
profession and expression of citizenship, the 
military will increasingly attract volunteers 
motivated purely for economic gain from 
increasingly narrower socio-economic 
segments of our society. The ultimate danger 
here (the primary fear and criticism of the 
AVF) is that an unrepresentative military 
evolves into a political pressure group, 
creating a crisis in American civil-military 
relations and threatening the liberal 
democratic order. Policies that harness 
public support for transitioning veterans 
(without victimizing them) reinforce positive 
societal beliefs about military service. A 
positive societal view of military service is 
thus important to encourage broader socio-
economic representation in the AVF. 
Most	importantly,	the	benefits	and	sup-
ports that veterans receive tie directly to all 
three support systems described above. First, 
they provide additional economic incentives 
to serve. Second, they symbolically honor 
veterans and military families for their 
sacrifices,	thus	reinforcing	individual	values	
of patriotism and civic duty. Third, they 
reinforce and sustain positive societal values 
toward	military	service	through	reaffirm-
ing their obligations. A National Veterans 
Strategy	will	add	significant	value	along	each	
of these lines, thereby enhancing the overall 
recruiting and retention climate for the 
AVF and enabling a sustainable and strong 
national defense. 
Building Consensus and Process: Guiding Questions 
Perhaps the most pressing challenge in American public administration today is managing the inherent tension 
between	providing	efficient,	responsive	
governance and retaining the strategic agility 
(grand-strategic and inter-departmental) to 
rapidly adapt in an increasingly dynamic, 
uncertain world.  Building and sustaining 
consensus around a common vision – both 
within agencies and across the federal 
government – is absolutely essential in 
successful strategy-making (Trubowitz, 
Goldman,	&	Rhodes,	1999).	Yet,	in	our	federal	
system, power is purposely divided, values 
and interests are many and institutional 
change is incremental, which only 
complicates this task.  
The	preceding	section	identified	seven	
major	assumptions	that	ground	the	
central arguments supporting a National 
Veterans Strategy.  It is our contention that 
these assumptions inform the conceptual 
foundations of a “whole-of-government” 
effort, executed in partnership with the 
private sector and other stakeholders 
to veterans’ affairs, to articulate and 
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.  
In what follows, we offer a series of guiding 
questions that suggest a deliberative process 
to	either	challenge	or	affirm	the	foundational	
assumptions	identified	above.		Specifically,	
these questions are offered as a means to: 
1)  Constructively frame a debate on 
veterans’ issues toward the development 
of reasoned, popularly supported policy 
goals;	and	
2)  Serve as an initial framework from which 
to craft an increasingly robust model 
of engagement related to the strategic 
planning process — rules, incentives, 
oversight mechanisms and coordination 
of	resources	aimed	at	efficient	and	
effective policy implementation.  
Why do we, as Americans, care for our veterans?
   How have our history and traditions influenced these values?
   What are the moral/ethical considerations?
   What are the economic considerations?
   What are the security implications?
Who is an American veteran?
   Should the term be all-inclusive or exclusive?
   Who deserves support within this definition?  Are family members included in this  
 definition?  If not, why?  If so, which family members and to what extent?
   Is this definition immutable over time (total war vs. limited war vs. peacetime)?
   How does the type of military force (all-volunteer vs. citizen-soldier vs. mixed)  
 influence our definition of a veteran?
 Who should be involved in a strategic conversation and planning process  
impacting veterans’ policy?
   Federal government stakeholders?
   State and local government stakeholders?
   Non-profit, academic, and private sector stakeholders?
   The general public?
Building and sustaining consensus around a common vision – 
both within agencies and across the federal government – is 
absolutely essential in successful strategy-making.
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“
”
What recognition, entitlements and other services ought the nation provide its 
veterans and military families? 
   What is (are) the primary goal(s) of veteran transition?
   How do these goals support democratic values and Constitutional rights?
   How do these goals support the National Security Strategy and related strategic  
  planning documents?
   Is the intent of veteran transition restorative or progressive?  Why?
   What are fair and just rewards (symbolic and material) for military service?
   What breadth/scope of benefits and services is necessary to achieve  
 these goals?
How (and by who) should these benefits and services be delivered?
   The Tools of Government: Direct government?  Government-sponsored 
 enterprises?  Public-private networks?  Private sector/contracts?  Grants/Loans/ 
 Vouchers?  Combinations?
   How will the VA’s internal strategic plan fit within and support a broader National  
 Veterans Strategy?
   Which benefits and services fall outside the VA’s purview?  To what extent and why?
   What are the current administrative authorities and division of labor?   
 What integration and/or performance deficiencies need addressing?
   What are the trade-offs and transaction costs of reform (i.e., administrative  
 and program consolidation vs. new institutions to force/promote coordination)?
   Is there a need for specific ‘micro-strategies’ on cross-cutting issues  
 (i.e., post-traumatic stress, suicides, homelessness)?
What can the nation reasonably afford to provide its veterans?
   What can the nation afford?  What are the limits on veterans’ benefits?
   At what point does increasing benefits create an entitlement culture in the  
 military and negatively impact the quality and character of the AVF?
   In a constrained fiscal climate, what is the priority of benefits and services? 
   What are the eligibility criteria for benefits and services? Time in/character of  
 service? Combat/non-combat service? Injuries suffered?  Financial need?
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“We need bold and thoughtful 
strategies this year to address 
the challenges facing veterans 
and military families because 
the public’s attention will soon 
turn away from us. I applaud 
the concept of a National 
Veterans Strategy and encour-
age policymakers to give these 
recommendations serious 
attention.”  
 
—Kathy Roth-Douquet
	 Chief	Executive	Officer
 Blue Star Families
“This report is an important 
contribution to the growing 
canon of literature in support 
of a National Veterans Strategy 
and should help advance the 
national conversation toward 
actionable plans for policy 
change.” 
 
—Nancy	Berglass
	 Director,	the	Iraq	Afghanistan		 	
	 Deployment	Impact	Fund
 Senior Fellow, Center for a 
	 New	American	Security
16 A National Veterans Strategy: The Economic, Social and Security Imperative
Summary Recommendations
This paper provides the conceptual foun-dation	and	justification	for	a	National	Veterans Strategy. We maintain that the 
second Obama administration – in close part-
nership with Congress, state and local govern-
ments, veteran support organizations, and the 
private sector – is well-positioned to act on the 
opportunity detailed in this publication and by 
doing so confer to veterans, their families and 
to all Americans important social, economic 
and security advantages. 
Policymaking impacting veterans and their 
families need not – and certainly ought not 
– be adversarial. Undoubtedly, the veterans’ 
policy space is incredibly broad and complex. 
It is unreasonable to expect that one single 
federal	agency,	with	sufficient	organization	
and resources, is the panacea to the challenges 
facing transitioning veterans and military 
families. Veterans’ policy is a societal obliga-
tion. Accordingly, instead of being viewed as 
“institutional turf” to defend, annex, or avoid 
altogether, veterans’ policy should be viewed as 
a shared responsibility and be governed collab-
oratively to the greatest extent possible. 
Surely, all the hard work in translating 
concepts and policies to effective practice and 
good governance lies ahead. Successful collabo-
rative	governance	is	not	only	difficult	to	create	
but even more challenging to sustain given 
the multi-level leadership necessary to align 
structures, processes, and accountabilities over 
time	(Bryson,	Crosby	&	Stone,	2006).	But	given	
the overwhelming public support for veterans 
and military families, combined with progress 
and momentum gained from recent policy 
developments, now is the time to act. 
We conclude by offering six initial recom-
mendations to the Obama administration and 
Congress to consider in initiating a National 
Veterans Strategy.
RECOMMENDATION
Create a presidentially-directed Veterans’ 
Public Engagement and Collaborative 
Governance Commission, responsible for 
engaging a broad base of stakeholders in a 
dialogue on veterans’ issues. 
The president should direct the establishment 
of a Veterans’ Public Engagement and Collabo-
rative Governance Commission, compliant with 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), to: 
1) solicit public and private sector input and 
participation in the development of national 
veterans’	policy;	and	2)	to	make	recommenda-
tions on a national and “whole-of-government” 
approach to align government, public, and 
private sector veteran programs and initiatives 
under a common set of goals and principles. 
Veterans policy demands a collaborative 
governance approach – an  “arrangement 
where one or more public agencies directly 
engage [private] stakeholders in a collective 
decision-making process that is formal, consen-
sus-oriented and deliberative, and that aims to 
make or implement public policy or manage 
public	programs	or	assets”	(Ansell	&	Gash,	
2008,	p.	544).	Membership	of	this	commission	
would thus be intentionally broad and inclu-
sive. Still, it is imperative that this body report 
directly to the president, similar to the Presi-
dent’s Intelligence Advisory Board, to ensure 
the necessary reach and authority to motivate 
action and to sustain executive ownership of 
the process.
This	body	should	first	solicit	stakeholder	in-
put through a structured nationwide dialogue. 
This dialogue could be accomplished through 
a series of meetings across the country, leading 
up to a national conference or summit. Toward 
this end, the Commission might also consider 
collaborating with the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) and soliciting recommenda-
tions and lessons learned in public engagement 
with state and local government and private 
sector stakeholders. In fact, DHS recently 
implemented a similar model described above 
to encourage state, local and private sector 
participation in a national dialogue on home-
land security policy (DHS, 2012b, pp. D-1, D-2). 
Moreover, many important lessons from suc-
cessful community-level collaboration between 
VA facilities, federal, state and local veterans’ 
programs, and the public and private sector 
organizations will be invaluable to collect and 
draw upon throughout this process.
“Fewer and fewer Americans 
serve in the military and sac-
rifice in the nation’s wars.  
This proposal recommends a 
thoughtful and imaginative pro-
cess to begin to institutionalize 
and secure our responsibility 
to them and their families and 
to meet this national obligation 
more efficiently, more effec-
tively, and more transparently.  
Doing this should be a matter 
of high national priority.”
 
—James Wright
 President Emeritus & 
				Eleazar	Wheelock	Professor	of	History
 Dartmouth College
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Summary Recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
Establish a single point of authority (directive 
and budgetary), responsible for coordinating  
and directing the execution of a National 
Veterans Strategy.
The president should appoint and delegate the 
necessary authority to a single federal entity to 
lead and oversee the execution of an interagen-
cy	strategy	that	clearly	defines	a	national	vision	
for	veterans’	policy;	identifies	short-,	medium-,	
and long-term planning goals across the federal 
government;	establishes	formal	coordination	
mechanisms to drive effective policy coordina-
tion	and	execution;	and	promotes	transparency,	
accountability and maximum public and pri-
vate sector participation. This single authority 
would also assume responsibility to purposeful-
ly align the National Veterans Strategy within 
the broader National Security Strategy planning 
framework. Importantly, the Congressional 
oversight structure for this authority should be 
considered	carefully.	Subjecting	this	point	of	
authority to a multitude of oversight commit-
tees may be overly burdensome or self-defeat-
ing toward the end of improving effective and 
efficiency	interagency	coordination. 
RECOMMENDATION
Establish an Interagency Policy Committee on 
Veterans, responsible for crafting a National 
Veterans Strategy.
In parallel with the Veterans’ Public Engage-
ment and Collaborative Governance Commis-
sion, the president should create an interagency 
policy committee on veterans responsible for 
developing an enduring and comprehensive 
National Veterans Strategy. This committee 
would coordinate directly with the Domestic 
Policy Council and National Security Staff and 
fall within the existing framework for inter-
agency planning and presidential action.6 At 
the outset, this body should assess the critical 
preconditions to successful collaborative gover-
nance	(e.g.,	history	of	institutional	conflict	and	
cooperation, participation incentives, power 
and resource imbalances, leadership, institu-
tional design) and the feasibility of designing 
and integrating into the process itself tailored 
approaches to increase direct dialogue, trust, 
and the development of commitment and 
shared understanding across government and 
the	private	sector	(Ansell	&	Gash,	2008).	
Drawing	upon	the	findings	and	recom-
mendations from the Public Engagement 
Commission,	this	committee	should	specifical-
ly	focus	on:	areas	of	inefficient	service	delivery	
and	performance;	gaps	in	and	barriers	to	inter-
agency coordination and information sharing 
(both	institutional	and	regulatory);	opportuni-
ties for governance innovation, particularly in 
leveraging technology and other Web 2.0 tools 
to increase both interagency and public-pri-
vate	coordination;	and	recommended	reform	
initiatives to incorporate within the National 
Veterans Strategy implementation process.
RECOMMENDATION
Establish a standing National Veterans 
Advisory Board, responsible for providing 
strategic advice and counsel to the 
president, Congress and implementing 
agencies related to veteran’s policy.
As	previously	recommended	(Berglass,	2010;	
Carter, 2012), the president should formally 
establish a National Veterans Advisory Board. 
Ideally, this board would be born out of 
the initial public engagement commission, 
report to the president, and be comprised 
of key leaders and experts from partnering 
federal agencies, state and local government, 
veteran	support	nonprofit	organizations,	
the private sector, and academia. This body 
will	provide	long-term	objective	advice	and	
recommendations to the president, Congress, 
VA Secretary, and partner agencies on matters 
of strategic importance to veterans’ policy. 
Its initial charge would be to support the VA 
Secretary and Interagency Policy Committee 
on Veterans in developing courses of action to 
implement a strategic interagency planning 
process for veterans’ affairs policy. It would 
assume a long-term public engagement and 
governance role taken on by the initial com-
mission while helping to lead and strengthen 
an emerging policy and research community 
on veterans’ issues (Carter, 2012, pp. 24-25). 
Finally, this board would also collaborate with 
the	Veterans	Health	Administration’s	Office	of	
Research and Development.
RECOMMENDATION
Create and institutionalize a forward-looking, 
periodic review process designed to assess 
evolving veterans’ policy and programs 
across the federal government.
Finally, Congress should mandate the estab-
lishment of a forward-looking, periodic review 
process to continuously assess veterans’ policy 
and programs across the federal government. 
This review process serves the purpose of 
evaluating veteran and military family needs, 
long-term veterans’ policy goals, interagency 
coordination and alignment, capabilities 
and resources, and of ensuring government 
transparency and propriety. While this process 
would closely mirror and complement the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, it should be 
independently led by the sole authority ap-
pointed to direct the execution of the National 
Veterans Strategy, per prior recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION
Congress should create a voluntary 
coalition of veteran-serving organizations, 
philanthropic associations, and other 
private sector stakeholders, responsible 
for cultivating and formalizing a model 
of collaborative engagement (public-
private, private-private and national-state-
community) that best aligns the resources 
of government, corporate, foundation and 
community partners in support of veterans 
and their families.
Veterans and military families are faced 
with a large and increasing number of 
entities serving their needs.  This complex 
web of supportive services and resources 
creates both a distinct challenge for vet-
erans and family members to navigate  
and a broader problem of effectively 
and	efficiently	matching	services	to	the	
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needs of the population. Further, legal 
barriers currently obstruct opportunities 
for meaningful collaboration between the 
public and private sector, inhibiting the 
optimal utilization of corporate, foundation, 
and community-based resources alongside 
government provided support for veterans 
and military families.  
Accordingly, Congress should create 
a voluntary coalition of veteran-serving 
organizations, philanthropic associations 
and other private sector stakeholders, 
responsible for cultivating and formalizing a 
model of collaborative engagement (public-
private, private-private, and national-state-
community) that best aligns their collective 
efforts and resources. This coalition could 
be created as a “government corporation” 
and be charged with providing a means of 
internal and cross-sector communication 
and coordination. 
Additionally, this coalition would 
identify best practices and guiding principles 
for collaborative engagement related to 
programs and services for veteran and 
military families. Improved public-private 
engagement will strengthen relationships 
across all sectors, allowing all stakeholders 
to use their valuable resources to greater 
effect and further support the intended 
purpose of a the National Veterans Strategy.
CONCLUSION
An extensive and ongoing review of both pub-
lic and private sector policy and programing 
motivated our purpose: to suggest a researched 
and logically-developed case for action toward 
a coordinated and consensus-driven National 
Veterans Strategy. 
In this report, we have detailed a logic 
supporting such action, grounded in both 
this nation’s social and cultural traditions and 
situated in the practical realities characteristic 
of the contemporary economic and security 
environment. 
The	central	finding	of	this	report	is	that	
coordinated “whole-of-government” action 
focused toward crafting and institutionalizing 
a National Veterans Strategy is necessary to 
serve important economic, social and security 
objectives	for	the	nation	in	a	way	that	is	con-
sistent with the inherent social contract that 
defines	the	relationship	between	America	and	
its veterans.
“To demonstrate that we  
honor and respect our military
veterans, our nation should 
engage the brightest minds in 
the public and private sectors 
to work together to establish  
a national veterans strategy. 
The time to do this is now.”
 
—Steve Robinson
 U.S. Army Veteran
	 Leading	Veterans	Advocate
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NOTES
1As of January 2012, veteran homelessness was 
estimated at 62,619, a 7.2% reduction from the 
previous year.
2All references to the all-volunteer force include Active 
duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces.
3DoD has ten primary mission areas: Counterterrorism 
and Irregular Warfare; Deter and Defeat Aggression; 
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial 
Challenges; Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space; Maintain 
a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent; Defend 
the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; 
Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability and 
Counterinsurgency Operations; Conduct Humanitarian, 
Disaster Relief, and Other Operations.
4In July 2001, 11,612 registered veteran support 
nonprofits filed 990s, reporting $6.208 trillion in 
assets.  In Aug 2012, these figured were 32,850 and 
$9.150 trillion.  This data was drawn from the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics by using their Custom 
Table Wizard tool and conducting a query on military 
and veteran organizations (Code W30).
5Post-9/11 veterans are faring better in the labor 
market than the general public, although younger 
cohorts (ages 18-24) are particularly vulnerable to 
unemployment compared to their civilian counterparts. 
6We would like to acknowledge Phil Carter for his 
helpful input on this recommendation.
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